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LEGISLATIVE NOTES: 
THE FDA'S OVER-THE-COUNTER DRUG REVIEW: 
EXPEDITIOUS ENFORCEMENT BY RULEMAKING 
On May 11, 1972, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) issued a final order1 establishing procedures for review of all 
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. 2 The OTC drug review attempts to 
evaluate the safety, effectiveness and labeling of OTC drugs pursuant to 
the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act3 and the 1962 amend-
ments4 to that act. It is an awesome undertaking. The FDA estimates that 
between l 00,000 and 500,000 OTC drugs are currently on the market, 5 the 
great majority of which have not undergone any premarket review by the 
FDA. 6 
The OTC drug review represents a significant departure from tradi-
tional drug regulation in two respects. First, the review involves 
monographs-regulations for broad categories of OTC drugs-rather than 
case-by-case adjudication for individual drugs. 7 Second, the FDA is rely-
ing heavily on non-FDA scientific experts to evaluate the drugs included 
in the review, rather than depending primarily on its own staff. 
1 37 Fed. Reg. 9, 473 (1972) (codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 330 (1977)). The proposed order 
was published in January of 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). 
2 The amended Act does not distinguish between prescription and OTC drugs. It does, 
however, define the conditions under which a drug can be marketed, 21 U .S.C. § 355(d) 
(1970); for example, whether it can be marketed OTC or only by prescription. In addition, it 
provides that a drug is misbranded when dispensed without a prescription if it is habit-
forming, if it is toxic or otheiwise potentially harmful, if its method of use is unsafe without 
supervision by a licensed practitioner, or if the approved NOA limits its dispensation to 
prescription sales. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(I) (1970). All other drugs are OTC drugs by implica-
tion and long-established understanding. FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 72,010. 
The FDA is authorized under section 701(a) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 37 l(a} ( 1970), to 
administratively determine whether a drug is a prescription or OTC drug. National Nutri-
tional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 699 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
827 ( 1975) (upholding FDA regulations classifying vitamins A and D in excess of specified 
dosages as prescription drugs). Pursuant to this authority, FDA regulations provide that: 
a drug shall be permitted for OTC sale and use by the laity unless, because of its 
toxicity or other potential for harmful effect or because of the method of collateral 
measures necessary to its use, it may be safely sold and used only under the 
supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs. 
21 C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(4)(vi) (1977). 
Pharmacists have long sought approval for a third intermediate drug category that can be 
sold OTC under the supervision of a pharmacist, but this proposal has yet to receive serious 
attention. Myers & Fink, Legal Considerations in Establishing Third and Fourth Classes,~[ 
Drug Products. 31 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 4 (1974); DRUG TOPICS 14 (1977). 
3 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970). 
• 76 Stat. 780 (1962). 
5 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). 
6 See notes 15-17 and accompanying text infra. 
7 See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra. See also DiPrima. Some Partisan Musings 
on the OTC Review and the Advertising TRRs, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 405, 406 (1977). 
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This article attempts to show that the OTC drug review has distinct 
advantages over traditional drug regulation. Part I outlines briefly the 
traditional case-by-case approach to drug licensing and describes FDA 
enforcement efforts prior to the OTC drug review. Part II sets forth the 
new rulemaking approach and considers the use of advisory panels. Part 
III examines several procedural questions associated with the review and 
concludes that the use of monographs as regulatory standards will afford 
the FDA an expeditious enforcement mechanism by resolving complex 
scientific issues at the administrative rather than the judicial level. Judi-
cial review should be available, however, to ensure the reasonableness of 
the monographs, especially where a final monograph does not incorporate 
panel recommendations. 
I. NOA APPROACH 
The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended,8 requires that the 
FDA create an administrative review mechanism to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of any "new drug" before marketing. 9 The 1938 Act defined a 
"new drug" as a drug which was "not generally recognized, among 
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the 
safety of drµgs, as safe. " 10 The 1962 amendments expanded the definition 
to encompass drugs not generally recognized as safe and effective 
(GRAS&E).11 Manufacturers of "new drugs" are required to submit new 
drug applications (ND As) to the FDA prior to marketing. 12 An application 
must contain a list of ingredients, samples of the drug, an example of the 
labeling, studies showing the drug to be safe and effective, and a descrip-
8 21 U .S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970). 
9 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 505(a); 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). The need for 
premarket review was demonstrated by the deaths of 107 people from a sulfa preparation in 
which diethylene, a chemical related to antifreeze, was used as a solvent. The only tests 
conducted by the company were for appearance, flavor and fragrance. H. TEFF & C. 
MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 108 (1976). The then existing Food and 
Drug Act of 1906, §§ I, 2, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), was exclusively a policing statute prohibiting 
the sale of adulterated or misbranded food or drugs. The FDA instituted seizure actions after 
it learned of the deaths, but seizure was legally possible only because the drug was labeled 
an "elixir," which erroneously implied it contained alcohol. See M. MINTZ, BY PRESCRIP-
TION ONLY 48-49 (1%7). 
10 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 20l(p)(I), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
11 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(I) (1970), as amended by § 102(a)(I), 76 Stat. 780 (1962). The 
Thalidomide tragedy in Europe precipitated a general Congressional awareness that the 1938 
Act might no longer be adequate. Thalidomide was absent from United States markets 
because of the stubbornness of a single FDA member rather than the provisions of the 1938 
Act. See H. Teff & C. Munro,supra note 9, at 120-21. The amendments were primarily 
aimed at the testing of new drugs. See Mintz, supra note 9, Ch. 12. 
12 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). Since general recognition is the crucial focus of inquiry, it is 
often not clear whether a drug is a "new drug." One relevant consideration is the marketing 
history of the drug. Section 201(p)(2) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p}(2) (1970), specifi-
cally treats any drug as a "new drug" unless it has been marketed for a material length of 
time. One advantage of the OTC drug review is that a manufacturer will know whether a 
particular drug falls within the "new drug" definition, thus requiring an approved NOA 
before marketing. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra. 
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tion of its method of manufacture. 13 A "new drug" may not be marketed 
until the NDA is approved by the FDA. 14 
Only an exceedingly small proportion of the OTC drugs on the market 
go through the NOA process. 15 The vast majority are marketed on the 
assumption that they are GRAS&E, which puts the burden on the FDA to 
initiate regulatory action. 16 More importantly, both the 1938 Act and the 
1962 amendments contained grandfather clauses exempting most OTC 
drugs which had not gone through the NOA process from the statutory 
definition of a "new drug." 17 Thus, a review of all OTC drugs was not 
possible under the premarket review mechanism provided by the 
amended 1938 Act. 
The 1962 amendments required the FDA to evaluate all NDAs effective 
prior to 1962 to ascertain the effectiveness of the drugs covered by those 
applications, 18 and to withdraw approval if "substantial evidence" of a 
drug's efficacy was lacking. 19 To speed implementation of the 1962 
13 21 u.s.c. § 355(b) (1970). 
14 Id., § 355(a). The 1938 Act allowed an NDA to become effective within 60 days of 
submission unless the FDA refused approval, § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), but the 1962 
amendments require FDA approval before a "new drug" can be marketed. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(d) (1970). The FDA can bring enforcement actions in the federal district courts for 
injunction, criminal prosecution, or in rem seizure and condemnation. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 
(1970). 
The NDA process is a laborious one for both the FDA and the pharmaceutical manufac-
turers. Approximately 100 NDAs were being submitted to the FDA annually in 1974. J. 
MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 470 
(1975). By 1963, the typical NDA had grown in length from six to approximately 1,000 pages, 
and required nineteen to twenty-six months for processing. See Note, The Drug Amend-
ments of /962, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1082, 1092 n.1 (1963). By 1969, each submitted NDA 
contained about thirty volumes constituting a stack ten to twelve feet high with some NDAs 
containing up to four hundred volumes of data. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dun-
ning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 624 (1973). 
15 Only 420 of the approximately 4000 NDAs reviewed by the NAS-NRC, see notes 20-22 
and accompanying text infra, panels involved OTC drugs. 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). 
16 The Act does not state who determines whether a drug needs an NDA, and the 
pharmaceutical industry contended that determinations by individual manufacturers would 
be sufficient prior to marketing. Prior to 1973, the FDA attempted to block marketing of 
drugs which it found not GRAS&E primarily by court action. However, in 1973, the 
Supreme- Court held that the FDA could issue a declaratory order that a drug is a "new 
drug," thus requiring manufacturers to challenge the declaratory order in court. Weinberger 
v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973). 
17 The 1938 Act exempted from the "new drug" definition any drug subject at any time to 
the 1906 Act if at such time the labeling contained the same representations concerning use. 
§ 201(p)(I), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). The 1962 amendments exempted certain drugs that were 
commercially used or sold in the United States on the day preceding the enactment of the 
1962 amendments. In order to be exempt, a drug had to be generally recognized as safe on 
the day prior to the amendments, not covered by an effective NDA, and "intended solely for 
use under conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in labeling with respect to 
such drug(s) on that day."§ 107(c)(4). 76 Stat. 789 (1962). The FDA can always challenge 
the grandfather status of a drug by asserting that the drug was not generally recognized as 
safe before the amendments. 
An anomaly exists between the grandfather clause of the 1962 amendments exempting 
certain drugs having no NDA from the definition of a "new drug" and § 107(c)(3)(B), 76 
Stat. 788 (1962), which provides drugs with NDAs a two year exemption from the efficacy 
requirements. There is no perceptible reason for this difference. 
18 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(3) (1970). The retroactive effect of§ 355(e) was upheld in Wein-
berger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973). 
1
" 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1970). 
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amendments, the FDA contracted in 1966 with the National Academy of 
Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) to review the pre-1962 
NDAs.20 A large number of drugs were found deficient, and after a review 
of the NAS-NRC findings submitted in 1969, the FDA implemented the 
results through its Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program. 21 Only 
25 percent of the OTC drugs evaluated by the NAS-NRC study were 
found to be "effective, " 22 and accordingly, the FDA decided to review all 
OTC drugs. 23 
II. OTC DRUG REVIEW 
A. Rulemaking Approach 
The FDA adopted a rulemaking approach to circumvent the deficien-
cies of the NOA process. Monographs covering various therapeutic cate-
gories of OTC drugs establish ''the conditions under which a category of 
OTC drugs is generally recognized as safe and effective and not mis-
branded. " 24 Drugs conforming to an applicable monograph are not "new 
drugs" and need not go through the NOA process. 25 Drugs not within the 
20 MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 470. Each NDA was evaluated separately on a 
continuum as follows: (I) effective; (2) probably effective; (3) possibly effective; (4) effec-
tive, but ... better or safer drugs are available; (5) ineffective as a fixed combination; (6) 
ineffective. The evaluation of an NDA was typically a one page summary giving the 
conclusion of the panel and perhaps a list of published articles used as references. The study 
was characterized as "cryptic and conclusory without any statement of supporting facts." 
U.S.V. Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
21 See MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14 at 470-518; Ames & McCracken, Framing 
Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA as a Case Study, 64 CAL. L. 
REv. 14 (1976); Note, Drug Efficacy and the /962 Drug Amendements, 60 GEO. L.J. 185 
(1971). 
As already noted, the 1962 amendments require the FDA to prohibit the marketing of any 
"new drugs" whose efficacy has not been demonstrated by "substantial evidence." 21 
U.S.C. §§ 355(d) (disapproval of a submitted NDA) and 355(e) (withdrawal of an outstanding 
NDA). However, the FDA is required to give the manufacturer notice and opportunity for 
hearing before disapproval or withdrawal of the NDA. Id. In order to expedite the with-
drawal of drugs found not to be effective in the NAS-NRC study, the FDA promulgated 
regulations elaborating the types of "substantial evidence," as defined in the Act, necessary 
to show drug efficacy. The regulations impose strict conditions on the conduct of clinical 
studies. If the manufacturer cannot or does not submit adequate and well-controlled studies 
after receiving notice from the FDA, the NDA is disapproved or withdrawn without an 
opportunity for hearing. This summary judgment procedure was upheld in Weinberger v. 
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973). 
22 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). The 25 percent figure may be somewhat misleading because the 
panel members in the Drug Efficacy Study used a very exacting substantial evidence 
requirement for an "effective" ranking, which led to liberal use of the "probably effective" 
and "possibly effective" ratings. J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 14, at 471. 
23 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). 
24 21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(9) (1977). 
25 A manufacturer is provided with a safe harbor from regulatory enforcement if it 
complies with the terms of the monograph. One issue is whether the manufacturer will be 
allowed to prove that the drug is GRAS&E and not misbranded under the statute if it does 
not conform to the monograph. See notes 95-120 and accompanying text infra. 
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· parameters of an applicable monograph are subject to regulatory action 
by the FDA unless already covered by an approved NDA.26 
The misbranding 27 requirement is intended to circumvent the grand-
father clauses exempting most OTC drugs from the "new drug" defini-
tion. 28 A drug whose label contains false representations is misbranded. 29 
The final monograph specifies the labeling that must appear on drugs in 
that therapeutic category. If its labeling is changed to avoid liability for 
-misbranding, the drug loses its grandfather clause protection and falls 
within the definition of a "new drug. " 30 Thus, the FDA has been able to 
use the threat of misbranding sanctions to regulate the effectiveness of 
grandfathered drugs through the OTC drug review. 31 
To implement the new program the FDA formed scientific advisory 
panels composed of eminent non-FDA medical experts to study OTC 
26 C.F.R. § 330. IO(b)(l977). The OTC drug review does not supplant the NDA process 
entirely, but rather provides an alternative procedure to follow. An expedited or abbreviated 
version of an NDA can be utilized by making use of the final monograph. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 330.11 (1977). Abbreviated NDAs were originally used to implement the results of the 
Drug Efficacy Study. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra. Drugs found "effec-
tive" by an NAS-NRC panel could be marketed. The abbreviated procedure was intended to 
eliminate the need for redundant studies. McEniry, Drug Monographs, 29 Fooo DRUG 
CosM. L.J. 166 (1974). 
27 The Act provides that a drug shall be deemed misbranded if its labeling is in any way 
false or misleading, if its labeling bears inadequate directions for use, or if it is dangerous to 
health when used with the dosage, frequency, or duration prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the labeling. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (f), (i) (1970). The FDA's misbranding 
authority is a carryover of its power under the 1906 Act, see note 9 supra, and is in addition 
to its licensing power for "new drugs." Misbranding is a prohibited act, 21 U.S.C. § 33 l(b) 
(1970), and involves the same sanctions as marketing a "new drug" without an NOA. See 
note· 14 supra. 
28 See note 17 s11pra. 
29 See note 27 supra. 
30 See note 17 supra. 
31 The Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 
(1973), recognized the primary jurisdiction of the FDA over all issues pertaining to "new 
drugs" rather than limiting the FDA to its express statutory jurisdiction, §§ 505(d) (disap-
proval of a submitted NOA) and 505(e) (withdrawal of an outstanding NDA). 412 U.S. at 
652. The primary jurisdiction doctrine involves situations where both a court and an 
administrative agency have concurrent original jurisdiction, yet it is presumed that the 
agency is a better forum for reaching an initial decision. "The principal criterion in deciding 
whether the doctrine is applicable usually is not legislative intent but is judicial appraisal of 
need or lack of need for resort to administrative judgment." DA VIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TEXT§ 19.06 (3d ed. 1972). The specialized expertise of an agency and the desirability for 
uniformity are the usual justifications for according an agency primary jurisdiction. The 
claim of the FDA's specialized expertise is buttressed when it relies on the expert advisory 
panels. 
While the Supreme Court has recognized the FDA's primary jurisdiction over the "new 
drug" issue, it is unclear whether the FDA has primary jurisdiction to deterrn_ine misbrand-
ing of drugs. Misbranding has traditionally been resolved by the courts in individual en-
forcement proceedings. MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 541. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) 
(1970) states that a misbranded drug "shall be liable to be proceeded against ... 'in any 
district court ... "and does not mention administrative enforcement. See generally Ames & 
McCracken, supra note 21, at 55-72, supporting primary jurisdiction over misbranding as it 
pertains to the OTC drug review. 
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drugs. 32 Twenty-six therapeutic drug categories were established,33 and 
seventeen panels were created to review these categories.34 Each panel 
was responsible for certain therapeutic categories.35 
The panels are expected to lay the groundwork for the monographs that 
will govern the therapeutic drug categories. They are "to evaluate the 
safety and effectiveness of OTC drugs, to review OTC drug labeling, and 
to advise[the Commissioner] on the promulgation of monographs. " 36 The 
panels may solicit opinions and information from any individual or 
group,37 and interested parties may submit data and opinions to the panels 
for consideration.38 After evaluation of the data, each panel submits a 
report to the Commissioner containing its conclusions and recom-
mendations, including a recommended monograph or monographs. 39 
After receiving an advisory panel report, the Commissioner is to pub-
lish a proposed monograph, allowing ninety days for written comments 
and an additional thirty days for reply comments. 40 After reviewing all 
32 21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(l) (1977). The FDA has made extensive use of advisory panels 
since the inception of the OTC drug review, 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 (1977); see generally 
Schmidt, Communication as the Basis of Regulation, 29 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 9 (1974). 
The advisory panel framework was explicitly endorsed by congressional legislation concern-
ing the classification of medical devices intended for human use. Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976, § 2, 90 Stat. 540. 
33 21 C. F.R. § 330.5 (1977). A catch-all category for miscellaneous products was divided 
into the categories of internal and external products. Saccharin was initially included for 
review in the Miscellaneous Internal Products Panel. 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,004 (1977). 
34 The regulations provide that "a single advisory review panel shall be established for 
each designated category of OTC drugs and every OTC drug category will be considered by 
a panel." 21 C. F. R. § 330. lO(a)(I). Overlap between several categories led to their consoli-
dation for consideration by only one panel, however. Yingling, The Over-The-Counter-
Drug-Review, 28 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 273 (1973). More comprehensive consideration of 
combination drugs was given as ajustification for the consolidation. Id. A combination drug 
is one that contains two or more active ingredients to treat multiple symptoms. See 21 
C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(4)(iv) (1977) for the FDA's policy concerning combination OTC drugs. 
35 21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(l) (1977). 
36 Id. 
37 Id.§ 330.10(a)(2) (1977). 
38 Id. § 330. IO(a)(3). 
39 Id. § 330.1 O(a)(5)(i). The report is a review of product ingredients and dosages, not a 
review of individual brand-name products. The panels are asked to place ingredients in one 
of three categories: Category I (GRAS&E); Category II (not GRAS&E); or Category III 
(more studies necessary). 21 C.F.R. § 330. IO (1977). Category III drugs can be marketed 
pending completion of the necessary studies under conditions prescribed by the FDA. 42 
Fed. Reg. 19, 137 (1977). There is no provision in the law for a Category III listing, and such 
status may be incompatible with continued lawful marketing absent an approved NDA. The 
issue is being litigated in Health Research Group v. Kennedy, Civ. No. 77-0734 (D.D.C.). 
With submission of the final report, the FDA terminates the panel pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 
14.55 (1977), and deletes it from the list of standing advisory panels in§ 14.100. For example, 
the Laxative, Antidiarrheal, Emetic and Antiemitic Drug Panel was terminated on July 17, 
1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 41,851 (1977). Interestingly, its conclusions were published more than 
two years earlier. 40 Fed. Reg. 12,902 (1975). This panel was one of those recommended for 
elimination in President Carter's reorganization plan. See The President's Advisory Commit-
tee Reduction Program, Prepared by the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Man-
agement of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 78 
(1977). 
40 21 C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(6). The reply comments are to respond to initial comments rather 
than to reiterate previously indicated positions. Id. Originally, sixty days were allowed for 
written comments but this period was extended to ninety days. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,800 (1977). 
21 C.F.R. §330.IO(a)(6) (1977) has not yet been revised to reflect this change. 
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comments, a tentative final monograph is to be published, allowing thirty 
days for specific written objections and requests for an oral hearing.41 
After reviewing written objections and considering arguments made at 
any hearing, the Commissioner publishes the final monograph. 42 
There are several advantages to the FDA's rulemaking approach. First, 
given the large number of OTC drugs on the market, case-by-case review 
would put a tremendous burden on the limited resources of the FDA as 
well as on the courts, the pharmaceutical industry, and the scientific 
community. 43 Moreover, the FDA, in its own estimation, has been quite 
unsuccessful in proceeding on a case-by-case basis.44 Second, the length 
of time required for case-by-case review leads to inequitable results; some 
products remain on the market indefinitely while similar drugs are sub-
jected to legal action. 45 Third, rulemaking for specific OTC drug categor-
ies is practical and more efficient because OTC drugs are composed of 
relatively few active ingredients. 46 
41 21 C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(7) (1977). Both reply comments and tentative final monograph are 
innovative administrative procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides 
for two basic rulemaking models: informal "notice and comment" procedures of§ 4(b) of 
the APA, 5 U .S.C. § 553(c) (1977). and formal rulemaking under§§ 6, 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 556, 557 (1977). The FDA is relying on§ 701(a) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970), 
as authority for the review. Formal rulemaking is not required because § 701(a) does not 
require rulemaking to be "on the record." See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway 
Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
Although formal rulemaking appears unnecessary, the informal "notice and comment" 
procedures provided by the APA may be deficient under the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment because of the importance of the monographs. The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals has expressed approval of "notice and comment-plus" procedure. Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International HarvestorCorp. v. Ruckelhaus, 
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing a limited right of cross-examination); Walter Holm 
& Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Williams, Hybrid Rulemak-
ing Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 401 (1975). The FDA has not provided the opportunity for cross-examination at any 
stage during the OTC drug review, but it is evidently hoped that the inclusion of reply 
comments and tentative final monographs will comport with expanded notions of due 
process in supplementing the APA's "notice and comment" procedures. Cross-examination 
is not a requisite element whenever "notice and comment-plus" ruiemaking is necessary; 
courts have been more concerned with ensuring a thorough ventilation of the issues rather 
than the means used by the agency to discuss these issues. National Research Defense 
Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976). · 
Cross-examination would permit more meaningful court review, but the potential for delay 
makes it an unattractive alternative for the FDA. The classic paradigm of delay associated 
with cross-examination is the ten year proceeding conducted under the formal rulemaking 
procedures of 21 U .S.C. § 701(e) (1970), concerning the quantity of peanuts in a product 
required before the product could be labeled "peanut butter." Hamilton, Rule making on a 
Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REv. 1132, 1142-45 (1972). 
42 21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(9) (1977). 
43 37 Fed. Reg. 85, 86 (1972). The desirability of a therapeutic class approach received 
endorsement in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceutical, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973). 
44 See generally Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration Part 
II: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Re-
sources of the House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., )st Sess. 65-72 
(1975) (testimony of Peter Baron Hutt, former FDA Chief Counsel) [hereinafter cited as 
Advisory Committee Hearings]. 
45 This inequity was recognized in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 
645, 653 (1973), which upheld the FDA's primary jurisdiction over the "new drug" issue. 
46 37 Fed. Reg. 85, 86 (1972). 
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Except for cases of patent fraud or serious health hazard, a moratorium 
on drug enforcement is in effect until publication of a final monograph for 
a particular therapeutic category.47 The moratorium has been defended 
on the grounds that the long term benefits outweigh the short term 
dislocations. 48 It has created several problems, however. First, enforce-
ment is delayed during the lengthy time period between panel 
recommendations and the promulgation of the final monograph. 49 The 
delays have been criticized by members of the House Committee on 
Governmental Operations as being detrimental to the public by permitting 
the continued marketing of ineffective drugs. 50 On balance, however, it 
would appear appropriate to stay enforcement unless continued market-
ing poses a health threat. 51 
Second, the moratorium has encouraged some manufacturers to con-
vert their prescription drugs to OTC status. A manufacturer may decide 
on its own to market a drug OTC,52 gambling that it is GRAS&E as an 
OTC drug and thus not subject to regulatory action for not having an 
approved NDA.53 The FDA has expressly approved use of the OTC drug 
review as a means for converting from prescription to OTC status. 54 The 
OTC drug panels may review any prescription drugs which they believe 
can be safely and effectively used as OTC drugs, 55 and a drug manufac-
turer may specifically request an advisory panel to review a particular 
prescription drug. 56 
As a result of the drug moratorium, a few manufacturers marketed 
drugs OTC on the basis of preliminary panel findings instead of waiting 
47 See Pineo, The FDA's OTC Drug Review - The Light at the End of the Tunnel, 31 FooD 
DRUG CosM. L.J. 141 (1976). After promulgation of the final monograph, there is a certain 
period of time before enforcement begins for drugs in that therapeutic category. See 42 Fed. 
Reg. 35,346 (1977). 
A number of exceptions to the moratorium have been established. Perhaps the most 
prominent example is the FDA's 1972 restrictions on the use of hexachlorophene, an 
antibacterial agent, because of the health threat it posed to infants. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,160 
(1972). The FDA's position is now contained at 21 C.F.R. § 250.250 (1977). 
48 Advisory Committee Hearings, supra note 44 at 70 (testimony of Peter Baron Hutt, 
former FDA Chief Counsel). The primary benefit of the OTC drug review will be the 
expeditious enforcement mechanism available to the FDA. The short term detriment is the 
suspension, as a practical matter, of drug enforcement against OTC drugs. 
49 For example, on September 13, 1974, the Commissioner issued a proposal to establish a 
monograph for OTC topical antimicrobial products for daily human use along with the report 
of the OTC Antimicrobial I Panel which was responsible for that category. 39 Fed. Reg. 
33,103 (1974). Publication of the tentative final monograph did not occur until January 6, 
1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,210 (1978). 
50 HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, USE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES BY THE FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, H.R. REP. No. 94-787, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976) 
(hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT). 
51 Advisory Committee Hearings. supra note 44 at 75. 
52 A drug manufacturer may also petition the FDA for approval of supplemental NDAs 
permitting OTC sale under the FDA switch regulations. 21 C.F.R. § 310.200 (1977). 
53 The drug will have an NOA for prescription but not OTC distribution. The marketing 
history of the prescription drug may indicate to the manufacturer that OTC status may be 
legitimately claimed. 
54 41 Fed. Reg. 32,58-0 (1976). 
55 21 C.F.R. § 310.IO(a)(2) (1977). 
56 Id. § 310.IO(a)O). 
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for publication of the final monograph.57 In response, the FDA published 
so-called "anti jump-the-gun" regulations which limit the permissible 
circumstances for conversions under the OTC drug review. 58 Basically, 
any prescription drug marketed OTC prior to the publication of the 
proposed monograph will be subject to regulatory action.59 After publica-
tion of the proposed monograph and before the effective date of the final 
monograph, a prescription drug found by the panel to be GRAS&E and 
not misbranded can be marketed but is subject to the risk that the 
Commissioner will not accept the panel findings and will take regulatory 
action. 60 
B. OTC Advisory Panels 
The regulations establishing the OTC drug review provide that panel 
members shall be qualified experts appointed by the Commissioner and 
"may include persons from lists submitted by organizations representing 
professional, consumer, and industry interests. " 61 The actual selection of 
panel members has shown a heavy dependence upon the academic com-
munity. 62 Pharmaceutical manufacturers have criticized this practice on 
the theory that academics may be biased against OTC drugs. 63 The 
industry argues that they are exposed to patients whose attempts at 
self-medication have failed rather than to the majority of cases where 
OTC drugs have given relief. 64 However, caution in reviewing the drugs is 
57 Pineo, supra note 47, at 144. 
58 41 Fed. Reg. 32,580 (1976). 
59 21 C.F.R. § 330.13(a) (1977). 
60 Id.§ 330.13(b)(2). The drug must also be marketed in compliance with the terms of a 
proposed or tentative final monograph to avoid regulatory action. Id. § 330.13(b)(2). A drug 
found by the panel to be Category II (not GRAS&E or misbranded) requires an approved 
NDA before being marketed as an OTC drug. Id. § 330.13(c)(2). A drug found by the panel to 
be Category III (more studies necessary) requires either a determination by the Commis-
sioner that the drug is GRAS&E or an approved NOA before marketing is permitted. Id. 
§ 330.13(d)(2). 
61 Id. § 330. IO(a)(l). Allowing the regulated industry a voice in the selection of panelists 
may raise the spectre of "crony ism" between the FDA and the industry. However, a former 
FDA chief counsel has said that "in the OTC Drug Review we have, if anything, gone 
overboard in making certain that everybody has an opportunity to participate." Hutt, Views 
on Supreme Court/FDA Decisions, 28 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 662, 666 (1973). The Com-
missioner is not required to include panelists from the submitted lists, but the opportunity to 
submit names is another facet of the FDA's desire to go beyond mere "notice and com-
ment" rulemaking. See note 41 supra. 
62 By way of illustration, the voting members of the Internal Analgesic and Antirheumatic 
Review Panel, which submitted its final report April 5, 1977, are as follows: Weldon 
Bellville, M.D., Chairman from August 1976, University of California, school of medicine, 
replacing Henry W. Elliott, M.D., Ph.D., who died in August 1976; William Barr, Ph.D., 
Virginia Medical College, pharmacy dept.; Ninfa Redmond, Ph.D., Concordia University, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Naomi Rothfield, M.D., University of Connecticut, school of 
medicine; George Sharpe, M.D., National Bureau of Standards, health unit. 42 Fed. Reg. 
35,347 (1977). 
63 O'Keefe, The Over-the-Counter Drug Review-Helping the Client Make Decisions, 29 
Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 262, 271 (1974); DiPrima, The OTC Review - Viewpoint of the 
Industry House Counsel, 27 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 532, 540 (1972). 
64 O'Keefe, supra note 63 at 271. As a factual matter, however, many conditions are 
self-alleviating. 
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desirable, and the selection of qualified experts not associated with the 
academic community should not be sine qua non of an effective advisory 
panel. The relevant pool of expertise outside academia is limited to 
physicians and pharmacists in private practice or associated with the 
pharmaceutical industry. Private practitioners are subject to the same 
concerns about bias as members of the academic community, 65 and 
choosing panel members associated with the pharmaceutical industry 
poses obvious conflict of interest problems.66 In any event, the pre-
eminent concern should be obtaining a diversity of qualified expertise 
capable of evaluating drugs in the given therapeutic category. 67 
In addition to voting panel members, two liaison members are included 
on each panel, one representing industry interests and the other 
representing consumer interests. 68 The primary purpose of the liaison 
members is to instill confidence in the OTC drug review by keeping the 
lines of communication open; they are to act as conduits between the 
panel and the interests they represent. 69 
Special problems arise because of the representative status of the 
liaison members. Although the industry liaison is to represent the industry 
as a whole, 70 it is possible that a member will act in the interests of a 
particular manufacturer rather than another manufacturer or the rest of 
the industry. For example, studies submitted for panel consideration 
containing trade secrets could be conveyed to the manufacturer's com-
petitor. To minimize this danger, certain safeguards have been developed 
to prevent the industry liaison from being exposed to confidential mate-
rial. 11 
65 An individual is likely to first resort to self-medication, contacting a physician only if 
the symptoms persist. Note that many medical professors also maintain private practices. 
66 Voting members must be cleared as special government employeees who have no 
personal financial stake in the outcome and no significant ties to pharmaceutical manufac-
turers or sellers. 21 C.F.R. § 14.80(a)(2) (1977). 
67 Id. § 14.SO(b)(l)(i). Panels are to consist of individuals with expertise in the particular 
subject matter under consideration. The members are also to "have diverse professional 
education, training, and experience so that the committee will reflect a balanced composi-
_tion of sufficient scientific expertise to handle the problems that come before it." Id. 
A scientific challenge to panel expertise might arise with the miscellaneous panels. 
Relatively unrelated categories are combined in the miscellaneous grouping, and it has been 
charged that the miscellaneous panels have evaluated drugs more properly within the 
expertise of specialized panels. DiPrima, supra note 7, at 408. 
68 21 C.F.R § 14.84(a) (1977). The FDA was cognizant of criticism leveled at the NAS-
NRC panels, see text accompanying notes 20-22 supra, due to the closed nature of the 
deliberations and the preponderance of panelists from academia. Advisory Committee 
Hearings, supra note 44, at 339 (testimony of Peter Baron Hutt, former FDA Chief Coun-
sel). 
69 The liaison members function in much the same manner, including the approval of 
panel minutes and planning future meetings, but they do not have the right to vote on 
substantive matters such as establishing the recommended monographs. 21 C.F.R. § 
14.86(a)(I) (1977). Additionally, their advocacy is limited in that they are not to exercise 
undue influence over other members of the advisory panel. Id. § 14.86(c)(6). Although the 
regulations do not clearly delineate when a liaison member abuses his or her position, the 
Commissioner has the power to remove any member who exceeds permissible bounds. Id. § 
14.86(d). 
70 Id. § 14.86(c)(4). 
?1 First, the industry liaison is not allowed to attend meetings whenever the topic covers 
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The major problem with the consumer liaison member involves the 
initial selection process. 72 The FDA initiaJly turned to an ad hoc consor-
tium of consumer organizations and asked them to choose a representa-
tive, not questioning their selection. 73 However, to formalize the selec-
tion of consumer liaison members and to make the selection more democ-
ratic, the FDA made several changes in procedure. Generally, nomina-
tions are received by the FDA, and consumer groups registered with the 
FDA vote for one of the nominees. 74 These changes will be of limited use 
in the OTC drug review because it is nearing completion, but the future 
selection of liaison members in other programs will be benefited by the 
procedures developed. 
The FDA has also promulgated regulations concerning the right of the 
public to attend panel meetings, 75 as well as the coroJlary right of access 
to panel meeting records. 76 The regulations generally provide that the 
meetings will be open unless trade secrets or information that invades an 
individual's privacy will be discussed. 77 
"trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information." Id. § 14.27(c)(l). 
Second, the industry liaison is barred access to such information even after it has been 
discussed by other members in a closed meeting. Id. § 14.86(a)(2). 
72 The FDA leaves the ultimate selection of liaison members to the respective groups. 
However, unlike the drug industry with its well-established trade associations, consumers 
are not uniformly represented. The Proprietary Association represents the OTC drug indus-
try while the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association represents 90 percent of the manu~ 
facturers of prescription drugs and those OTC drugs used in health professions. Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 138 (1967). On the other hand, consumers are an 
amorphous category without substantial internal cohesiveness, and consumer groups are 
often self-appointed representatives representing different segments of the consuming pub-
lic. Nonetheless, the consumer liaison member will help allay suspicion of "cronyism" 
between the FDA and the regulated industry by serving as a counter-weight to the industry 
liaison. 
73 The organizations included the Consumer Federation of America, the Consumers 
Union, and the Federation of Homemakers of America. See generally Advisory Committee 
Hearings, supra note 44, at 136. 
74 Notice will now be published in the Federal Register requesting nominations for the 
particular advisory panel. 21 C.F.R. § 14.84(c) (1977). Although nominations can come from 
any interested person, individuals are encouraged to submit the nominations through FDA 
recognized groups. Id. § 14.84(c)(I). Although these groups are entitled to vote on the 
nominees, id. § 14.84(c)(3), the FDA limits the number of nominees, id. § 14.84(c)(4). The 
ballots and the curriculum vitae of the eligible nominees are sent to recognized organizations 
on file with the FDA, and the individual receiving the plurality of votes will be the consumer 
liaison member. Id. § 14.84(c)(4). 
75 41 Fed. Reg. 52,147 (1976); codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 14 (1977). 
76 Jd. 
77 Id. Initially, many OTC advisory panels routinely closed meetings to the public on the 
ground that the deliberations, if transcribed, would constitute inter- or intra-departmental 
memoranda within the meaning of one of the exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act, 
5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970). This conclusion derived from language in the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, 86 Stat. 770 ( 1972). The panels are advisory committees under§ 3(2) of the 
FACA. Section IO(a)(l) of the FACA states that "each advisory committee meeting shall be 
open to the public," but subsection (d) qualifies this requirement by stating that § I O(a)(I) 
does not apply to any meeting excepted by the FOIA. 
Section IO(d) was amended by the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1247 (1976), 
to discontinue reliance upon 5 U .S.C. § 552(b). The determination to close a meeting must 
now be made in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) (1976) (also a part of the Sunshine 
Act). The applicable agency has to properly determine the disclosure of information would 
fall into certain enumerated categories. The FDA regulations concerning advisory panels 
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The minutes of panel meetings are also available for public inspec-
tion. 78 While minutes should not disclose confidential information, it is 
important to ensure that they contain enough specificity so that the public 
right of access is not eviscerated. The Federal Advisory Committee Act 
requires that "detailed minutes of each meeting of each advisory commit-
tee shall be kept and shall contain a record of the persons present, a 
complete and accurate description of matters discussed and conclusions 
reached.' ' 79 Detailed minutes not only protect the public right of access to 
information, but also check against undue pressure by FDA personnel 
over panel members.80 
III. SELECTED PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE OTC DRUG REVIEW 
A. Panel Recommendations and "New Drug" Status 
Panel members are eminent experts in their fields, and the statute 
closely conform to the Sunshine Act by permitting only those closings allowable under 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 21 C.F.R. § 14.27(b)(2) (1977). Generally, a meeting now may be closed 
only upon the Commissioner's determination and justification in the Federal Register. 21 
C.F.R. § 14.27(b) (1977). 
The regulations also require every panel meeting to have an open hearing component in 
which an interested party may participate through written and oral presentations. Id. § 
14.27(a). It is now possible that a meeting can have four separate segments: an open public 
hearing, open panel deliberations where the public can only observe, closed presentation of 
exempted data, and closed committee deliberations subject to the written authorization of 
the Commissioner. Id. § 14.25. 
78 The transcripts and minutes of the open portions of the meetings are publicly available, 
21 C.F.R. § 14.74(a)(2), (3) (1977), as are the written data submitted for the panel's 
consideration during an open meeting. Id. § 14.75(a)(I), (5). A brief summary of a closed 
portion is available upon demand. Id. § 14.75(a)(4). Even if material is found confidential, 
the minutes of the executive portion of the meeting can be released if the panel report or 
advice has received action, or the Commissioner determines that the minutes or portions 
thereof can be open to public disclosure without undue interference to panel or agency 
operations. Id. § 14.75(a)(6). 
79 Section IO(c), 86 Stat. 770. 
80 An example is the OTC Antacid Panel deliberations regarding the proposed removal of 
Alka-Seltzer from the market. Some panel members almost resigned because of "what they 
regarded as 'insuperable' restrictions placed upon their independent consideration of scien-
tific evidence." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 50, at 61-62. Detailed records 
would have allowed an independent determination as to whether the FDA did exert undue 
pressure upon panel members. In this instance, the independent determination would have 
been made by the Congressional Subcommittee studying FDA use of advisory committees. 
Id. 
Unlike the Drug Efficacy Study, discussed in the text accompanying notes 20-22 supra, 
the FDA has taken an active role in the OTC drug review. FDA facilities and personnel are 
available to the panels, and the FDA Chief Counsel made introductory remarks to each of 
the panels outlining the purposes and procedures to be followed. ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 50, at 8. Members of the Chief Counsel's staff regularly attend panel 
meetings, and preliminary panel reports ai:e reviewed by the staff for ambiguities and 
inconsistencies. The purpose of increased FDA participation is to avoid problems of the 
Drug Efficacy Study; the N AS-NRC panels were totally disassociated from the FDA and 
operated without communication between each other. Consequently, the standards used in 
evaluating the effective NDAs varied greatly from one panel to another. MASHAW & 
MERRILL, supra note 14, at 471. 
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defines a "new drug" as a drug not generally recognized by experts as 
safe and effective. 81 It has thus been suggested that a panel determination 
that a drug is safe and effective for OTC distribution might automatically 
remove the drug from the "new drug" category. 82 This question of 
administrative delegation arose in conjunction with Parke, Davis & Com-
pany v. Mathews, 83 which involved OTC marketing of Benylin Cough 
Syrup. Parke, Davis submitted data on Benylin to the Cough, Cold, 
Allergy, Bronchodilator and Antiasthmatic Drug P~nel (CCABA Panel) 
for OTC review. 84 The CCABA Panel recommended approval of the 
active ingredient in Benylin,85 but the Commissioner issued a proposed 
monograph disagreeing with the panel's conclusions. 86 Parke, Davis then 
brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Benylin is not a "new drug," and in the alternative, that the FDA be 
enjoined from initiating enforcement action pending final determination of 
Benylin's status. The court di9 not grant the declaratory judgment87 but 
did enjoin enforcement until thirty days after the FDA's final determina-
tion.88 
In making its holding, the court did not treat the panel recom-
mendations as binding on the FDA.89 The court was clearly correct in this 
regard. The purpose of the panels is "to advise [the Commissioner] on the 
promulgation of monographs."90 The FOA is empowered to administra-
tively determine the sufficiency of evidence concerning general recogni-
tion .91 Any delegation of this power92 would be an abdication of the 
81 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 201(p)(I), 21 U.S.C. § 32l(p)(I) (1962). 
82 The Pink Sheet, FDC REl'ORTS, December 6, 1976, at 16. As a practical matter, the 
Commissioner will usually abide by panel findings. However, it is unlikely that any in-
terested parties would be willing to forego the procedural safeguards provided before 
publication of the final monograph. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. 
83 Parke, Davis & Company v. Mathews, No. 6-72464, memorandum opinion, (E.D. 
'Mich. Jan. 7, 1977) (on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
84 Id. at 3. Prescription sale previously had been the only authorized method of distribu-
tion. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra concerning the conversion of prescrip-
tion drugs to OTC status. 
85 41 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,340 (1976). During this time, Parke, Davis also filed for two 
supplemental NDAs but the FDA deferred action on these applications until completion of 
the OTC drug review. Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 3. 
86 Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 4. At the same time, a denial of the supplemental ND As 
was published. Id. at 5. 
87 The court concluded that "these issues are currently under consideration by the FDA 
which has primary jurisdiction over such actions." Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 7. 
88 The court found that Parke, Davis has relied on prior FDA assurances that OTC 
marketing was permissible so that the present action withdrawing Benylin was arbitrary and 
capricious. Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 9. 
89 However, the court was influenced in its decision by the fact that "the advisory panel 
made a thorough study of the drug, its recommendation is supported by the affidavits of 
several other eminent experts in the field, and, in contrast, the Commissioner's tentative 
decision not to permit OTC sale is rather incompletely supported." Parke, Dai•is, supra note 
83, at 9. Such a situation will be a relevant consideration when the manufacturer seeks 
pre-enforcement judicial review of the final monograph. See notes 121-40 and accompanying 
text infra. 
90 21 C.F.R. § 330.lO(a)(I) (1977) (emphasis added). 
91 The FDA's primary jurisdiction over the "new drug" definition was recognized in 
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653 (1973). 
92 The FDA has not delegated this power to the panels and has very clearly reserved the 
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FDA 's statutory responsibilities93 and would raise the spectre of private 
government. 9 4 
B. Legislative-Interpretive Issue 
The final monographs issued by the FDA should be characterized by 
the courts in enforcement proceedings95 as legislative rather than in-
terpretive.96 A legislative rule is as valid and binding upon a court as a 
statute if it is within the granted power, issued pursuant to proper proce-
dure, and reasonable.97 On the other hand, agency interpretations of 
substantive legislation have been viewed as ''not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority [but merely] a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance. " 98 
It has been suggested that this distinction is of no practical significance 
because of the judicial deference routinely accorded all technical adminis-
trative regulations. 99 Judicial deference, however, will be much less pro-
nounced if the panel report is at odds with the final monograph as 
promulgated by the FDA. 100 A court probably will be more willing to 
support the Commissioner if the final monograph is supported by a 
comprehensive panel report. 
More importantly, if the monographs are interpretive, the court en-
power to disagree with the panels. See Advisory Committee Hearings, supra note 44, at 157. 
The regulations creating the panels provide that they are to "advise" the Commissioner. 21 
C.F.R. § 330. lO(a)(l) (1977). 
93 The doctrine of subdelegation (i.e., the delegation of power from an agency head to a 
lower official) has not been frequently invoked by the courts to invalidate agency action, 
DAVIS, supra note 31, § 9.01, but could be invoked here. Although panelists are special 
government employees, they resemble a private group more closely than do other agency 
personnel. 
94 Hoffman, After the Glorious Revolution: Thoughts for Food and Drug Lawyers on the 
New Regime, 29 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 234, 239 (1974). 
95 The FDA ultimately must resort to the courts for enforcement. See note 14 supra. 
96 Most commentators have phrased the issue as between "substantive" and "interpre-
tive." This note uses the word "legislative" in the place of "substantive" to avoid confu-
sion with substantive-procedural distinctions. 
97 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 5.03 (1958). The reasonableness require-
ment is said to stem "both from the idea of constitutional due process and from the idea of 
statutory interpretation that legislative bodies are assumed to intend to avoid the delegation 
of power to act unreasonably." Id. As to challenging the reasonableness of monographs, see 
text accompanying notes 121-40 infra. Davis states that 
[a]n interpretive rule may or may not have the force of law, depending upon such 
factors as (a) whether the court agrees or disagrees with the rule, (b) the extent to 
which the subject matter is within special administrative competence and beyond 
general judicial competence, (c) whether the rule is a contemporaneous construc-
tion of the statute by those who are assigned the task of implementing and enforc-
ing the statute, (d) whether the rule is one of long standing, and (e) whether the 
statute has been reenacted by legislators who know the content of the rule. Id.,§ 
5.03. 
98 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
99 Harlow, The FDA's OTC Drug Review: The Development and an Analysis of Some 
Aspects of the Procedure, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 248, 255 ( 1977). The practical effect of 
such deference is that the regulation is legislative. 
100 See notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra concerning the Benylin controversy. In 
particular, see note 89 supra. 
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forcement proceedings must determine whether the drug is GRAS&E and 
not misbranded. If the monographs are legislative, the issue before the 
court is limited to whether the drug complies with the monograph. The 
FDA clearly is seeking to avoid the potential for protracted litigation 
inherent in interpretive rules. By defining the critical statutory terms by 
legislative regulation, the FDA can avoid the potential for protracted 
litigation inherent in interpretive rules. Given the FDA 's need for ex-
peditious enforcement procedures and its capacity to resolve complex 
scientific issues, monographs should be accorded legislative status. 
The significance of the potential for delay can best be understood by 
examining the FDA 's pre-OTC drug review procedures. The FDA has 
sought to expedite enforcement by using summary judgment motions 
supported by affidavits of medical experts, contending that affidavits 
denying a drug's general recognition would be conclusive in establishing it 
as a "new drug. " 101 The FD A's position has not been well received by 
the courts. Although one court allowed summary judgment where both 
the manufacturer and the FDA submitted affidavits as to "general recog-
nition,"102 subsequent decisions have permitted summary judgment only 
when affidavits submitted by defendants did not even make a prima facie 
case of "general recognition. " 103 As a result, the FDA cannot be assured 
of summary judgment whenever the manufacturer produces affidavits 
tending to show that the particular product is GRAS&E. 
A final monograph eliminates reliance on affidavits and the inherent 
delay in obtaining them, 104 but the same judicial uncertainty as to the 
appropriateness of summary disposition is likely if the monographs are 
given interpretive effect. A court ultimately may abide by the monograph 
regardless of its characterization, but permitting the case to come to trial 
on the issues of G RAS&E and misbranding introduces time delay. Giving 
the monograph legislative effect would lead to administrative resolution, 
and remove the manufacturers' incentive to engage in protracted litiga-
tion.1os 
101 MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 464. See generally Advisory Committee 
Hearings, supra note 44, at 45-50. 
The FDA has also tried to show lack of general recognition by demonstrating an absence 
of any medical or scientific literature. The theory is that general recognition cannot exist in 
the absence of such literature because of exchanging information about a drug's safety or 
effectiveness. See United States v. An Article of Drug Labeled "Entrol-C Medicated," 362 
F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd, 513 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1975). 
102 Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1958). 
103 United States v. 7 Cartons••• Ferro-Lac, 293 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D. Ill. 1968), affd 
424 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1970) (criticizing Merritt as equating "general recognition" with 
unanimity); AMP v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 
(1968) (allowing summary judgment because the FDA affidavit was addressed to the lack of 
"general recognition" while the AMP affidavit was one doctor's opinion as to safety 
unsupported by other affidavits). The AMP court expressed reservations about summary 
judgments whenever there are affidavits presenting not only a difference of opinion as to 
safety but also as to "general recognition." Id. at 831. 
10
• Obtaining the affidavits of eminent experts is itself time consuming. See Advisory 
Committee Hearings, supra note 44, at 44, concerning the FDA's efforts in removing Vice 
Spice, a fraudulent aphrodisiac containing paprika, from the market. 
105 Harlow, supra note 99, at 258-59. Manufacturers will concentrate their energies on the 
advisory panels. The comments to the proposed OTC drug review indicated that "the 
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The monographs are promultaged under Section 70l(a) of the 1938 Act. 
Section 70l(a) generally vests authority to promulgate regulations for the 
efficient enforcement of the Act in the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW), 106 who has delegated this power to the Commissioner of 
the FDA.'°.7 The FDA contends that Section 70l(a) allows it "to proceed 
by substantive rule making rather than on a case-by-case basis, to par-
ticularize general statutory standards." 108 
The pharmaceutical industry claims that Congress never intended Sec-
tion 70l(a) to give the FDA authority to promulgate legislative regula-
tions.109 One commentator notes that Section 70l(e) specifically permits 
legislative rulemaking in certain situations and that the lack of similar 
language in Section 70l(a) means that legislative authority was not in-
tended for regulations under Section 70l(a)."0 The legislative history 
reveals that Section 70l(e) regulations were intended to "have the force 
of law and must be observed"'" while no such statement was made for 
Section 70l(a). In addition, Section 70l(e) contains a number of pro-
cedural protections which are not present in Section 70l(a). 112 
Judicial treatment of similar regulatory schemes nonetheless indicates 
that the final monographs should be given a legislative characteriza-
tion .113 The Second Circuit's decision in National Nutritional Foods 
regulations will be substantially followed by the industry." 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). Com-
pliance may be forthcoming regardless of the characterization of the monographs as legisla-
tive or interpretive, but the likelihood of compliance is greater if manufacturers are exposed 
to summary court procedures. See notes 121-40 and accompanying text infra concerning 
those situations where a manufacturer is supported by a comprehensive panel report, but the 
Commissioner fails to abide by panel recommendations. 
106 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 70l(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970). 
101 5 C.F.R. § 5.l(a)(l) (1977). 
108 37 Fed. Reg. at 9,471, ,I 85 (1972). 
109 Bass, ls the Substantive-Interpretive Issue Really Dead?, 30 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 
448 (1975); Whyte, The FDA's OTC Drug Review, 28 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 381, 384-388 
(1973); DiPrima, The OTC Review - Viewpoint of the Industry House Counsel, 27 FooD 
DRUG CosM. L.J. 532 (1972); Levine, Legal Ramifications of the OTC Drug Review, 27 
Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 571 (1972). 
110 DiPrima, supra note 109, at 534-35. 
111 H. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (1938). 
112 21 u.s.c. § 371 (1970). 
113 The FDA points to Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973), 
as demonstrating judicial acceptance of the monographs' legislative character. In its brief to 
the Court, the FDA characterized the May, 1972 regulations as "a procedure for determin-
ing in substantive rule-making, by therapeutic class, whether particular OTC products not 
covered by NDA's are generally recognized as safe and effective and not misbranded .... " 
Petitioner's brief, at 24. The Court did take cognizance of the OTC drug review and 
described its operation during the course of the opinion, 412 U.S. at 650, but the legislative 
issue was not before the Court. 
The court in National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), upheld the FTC's legal authority to promulgate 
legislative trade regulation rules (TRRs) for the purpose of carrying out the agency's duties 
in preventing "unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). The FTC derives its authority to issue 
regulations from section 6(g) of the FTC Act, 15 U .S.C. § 46(g) (1970), which provides that 
the Commission has the power " ... to make rules and regulations for the purpose of 
carrying out the provisions of sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title." This case is 
analogous because the FDA has similarly broad powers under section 70l(a) of the Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act. See also Mourning v. Family Publication Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 
356 (1973). 
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Ass'n v. Weinberger, 114 upholding regulations classifying vitamins A and 
D in excess of specified dosages as prescription drugs, 115 provides par-
ticularly strong support for the legislative effect of the monographs. The 
court construed Section 70l(a) as giving the FDA authority "to promul-
gate substantive regulations having the binding force of law rather than 
mere 'interpretive' statements enforceable only on a case-by-case 
basis. " 116 The court found the general delegation of authority in Section 
701(a) sufficient to sustain legislative rulemaking. 117 The specific proce-
dures set forth in Section 70l(e) were found to be in addition to and not in 
derogation of the general rulemaking power under Section 70l(a). 118 The 
court emphasized the lack of any legislative rulemaking prohibition under 
Section 70l(a) rather than express recognition of such power in Section 
701(e). 119 The Second Circuit's analysis of Section 70l(a) is equally ap-
plicable to the OTC drug review, and has been so interpreted by com-
mentators .120 
C. Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review 
Although the amended 1938 Act contains no provision for judicial re-
view of regulations promulgated under the authority of Section 70l(a), 121 
a manufacturer has at least two ways of challenging monographs in court. 
It can resist, as a defendant in an enforcement proceeding, by contesting 
the validity of the final order. 122 Alternatively, a manufacturer may seek 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief' 23 in an action for pre-
enforcement review. 124 
114 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). The trial court had 
referred to the OTC drug regulations as "of clearly substantive proportion" during the 
course of its opinion. 376 F. Supp. 142, 147 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
115 All preparations of vitamin A containing more than 10,000 IU (international units) per 
dosage form and of vitamin D containing more that 400 IU per dosage form were prescrip-
tion drugs. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,723 (1973). 
116 512 F.2d at 697. 
117 Id. at 696. 
118 
"Where once we may have demanded proof of specific delegation of legislative 
authority to an agency purporting to promulgate substantive rules we have learned from 
experience to accept a general delegation as sufficient in certain areas of expertise." Id. at 
696. 
119 Id. at 698. 
12 0 Ames & McCracken, supra note 21, at 57. 
121 Review by the court of appeals is explicitly provided for by regulations promulgated 
under section 701(e). The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,§ 701(f}, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970). 
122 Administrative Procedure Act (APA),§ lO(b}, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1977). See also DAVIS, 
supra note 97, § 23.07. 
123 Administrative Procedure Act (APA)§ !O(b), 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1977). See also DAVIS, 
supra, note 97, § 23.04. 
A preliminary issue is whether the federal district court has jurisdiction over the con-
troversy. 28 U. S.C. § 133 l(a) (1970) formerly required an amount in controversy exceeding 
$10.000, but the 1976 amendments to the APA eliminated this requirement, 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1331(a) (West Supp. 1978). The Supreme Court has recently ruled that section IO of the APA 
does not provide an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction permitting federal 
judicial review of agency action. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
124 Pre-enforcement review of interpretive regulations promulgated under the authority of 
section 701(a) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371_(a) (1970), was at one time thought to be 
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The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) determines the scope of 
judicial review in these actions. The FDA promulgates the monographs 
under the "notice and comment" procedures of Section 4(b) of the 
APA 125 rather than the formal "on the record" rulemaking of Sections 6 
and 7. 126 Although the APA is not clear, it is generally assumed that 
review under informal "notice and comment" rulemaking is governed by 
an "arbitrary or capricious" standard127 rather than the "substantial 
evidence" test128 followed for formal rulemaking. 129 
Courts under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard have generally 
been more tolerant of administrative action than under the "substantial 
evidence" test. 130 This standard may still require close judicial examina-
tion. The Second Circuit in Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger 
concluded "even under the 'arbitrary, capricious' st_andard agency action 
will not be upheld where the inadequacy of explanation frustrates re-
view." 131 There is a trend towards increased judicial scrutiny ofadminis-
... 
trative actions under the "arbitrary or capricious" test. 132 Judge Lum-
bard's concurring opinion in National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Wein-
berger merges the two standards: "when an agency engages in substan-
tive rulemaking, it abuses its discretion (or acts arbitrarily or capriciously) 
if its actions are not supported by substantial evidence." 133 
The FDA's use of outside experts in the formulation of monographs has 
led some commentators to suggest that courts are unlikely to find FDA 
unavailable; challenge had to come during an enforcement proceeding. Bass, supra note 109, 
at 450. This position is not tenable after Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 
(1967). Abbott Laboratories had the option of complying with regulations of debatable 
validity requiring the generic name of a prescription drug to follow each appearance of the 
proprietary name on the drug label or facing regulatory enforcement. The Court held this 
dilemma presented a sufficient controversy to warrant judicial review prior to FDA en-
forcement. 387 U.S. at 152-154. The same dilemma faces OTC drug manufacturers concern-
ing compliance with the final monograph. Compliance with the monograph may entail 
relabeling or recomposition of the product, while non-compliance assures regulatory action 
which can be costly in terms of public image and litigation expenses. 
125 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). The FDA has added several procedural steps such as reply 
comments and a tentative final monograph so as to meet the possible judicial requirements 
of "notice and comment-plus" rulemaking. See note 41 supra. 
126 5 u.s.c. §§ 556, 557 (1970). 
127 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § IO(e)(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). 
128 Administrative Procedure Act (APA),§ IO(e)(2)(E). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). 
129 National Ass'n of Food Chains v. I.C.C., 535 F.2d 1308, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
It has been asserted that the monographs, if given interpretive effect, should be reviewed 
under the "substantial evidence" test. Harlow, supra note 99, at 254. Interpretive rules are 
exempt from the "notice and comment" procedures of section 553. A "substantial evi-
dence" test, however, seems untenable because the monographs are not promulgated under 
the formal rulemaking procedures of sections 556 and 557. However, courts will give less 
deference to interpretive rules than to legislative regulations, Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 
82, 88 (5th Cir. 1974), and the scope of review may lie somewhere between that for 
legislative rules and that for agency adjudications. Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. 
Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 1338. 1341-42 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
130 MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 262-63. 
131 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975). 
132 See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402 (1971); National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1973). 
133 512 F.2d at 705. 
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action in promulgating monographs arbitrary or capricious .134 Where the 
Commissioner does not follow panel recommendations, however, a court 
may find that the FDA acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The 
FDA's final monograph must be supported by the administrative re-
cord, 135 and the court must consider panel recommendations because 
judicial review is of the record as a whole. 136 The court must therefore 
examine not only the justifications for the administrative action but also 
evidence that undercuts the decision. 137 
The 1938 Act makes the general recognition of a drug the crucial 
inquiry in determining "new drug" status. It may be argued that a drug 
cannot be GRAS&E when there is disagreement between the Commis-
sioner and the panel. 138 General recognition does not have to be unani-
mous, however, because even properly conducted studies may produce 
disagreement, 139 but the FDA will be obliged to support its position with 
well-documented facts. 140 Pre-enforcementjudicial review will be a feasi-
ble course for plaintiffs whose position is supported by a comprehensive 
panel report. 141 
134 Bass, supra note 109, at 452; Harlow, supra note 99, at 257. 
135 The grounds for agency action must clearly appear in the record, and the agency's 
analysis and reasoning must be plainly apparent. Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 
1029 (10th Cir. 1976). 
136 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § IO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Judicial review 
under the "arbitrary or capricious" test is not restricted to the record before the administra-
tive body. Beckham v. United States, 375 F.2d 782, 785 (Ct. Cl. 1967). An agency in 
preenforcement review cannot designate which items it considers to be in the administrative 
record. Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (D. Del. 1975). 
137 DAvis,supra note 97, § 29.01. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 
47 4, 487 (1951). 
138 The House Committee on Government Operations found the FDA staff to be compe-
tent for resolving many of the issues put before the advisory panels, ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 50, at 5, in making its charge that the FDA is making nonessential use of 
the panels. However, this charge ignores the enormousness of the regulatory task confront-
ing the FDA. The staff is also not likely to be as knowledgeable as the panel members on the 
particulars of any therapeutic category. 
139 United States v. Articles of Food and Drug, Etc., 518 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. 7 Cartons,• ••Ferro-Lac, 293 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd 424 
F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1970). 
140 See note 21 supra concerning the types of evidence that must be shown under §§ 
505(d), (e) of the amended 1938 Act. The Court in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973), held the same sort of inquiry applicable to the "new drug" issue; 
simple as,sertions will not be sufficient to establish GRAS&E. 
141 After the publication of the final monograph, several administrative alternatives are 
available. A manufacturer or consumer can petition the Commissioner to amend the final 
monograph. 21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a) (12) (1977). See 42 Fed. Reg. 19,137 (1977). A manufac-
turer can also file an NDA with the FDA. In an attempt to reduce the time and resources 
necessary for the approval of an NDA, an abbreviated procedure has been created whereby 
an application must include a statement "that the product meets all the conditions of the 
applicable monograph except for the deviation for which approval is requested and may omit 
all information except that pertinent to the deviation." 21 C.F.R. § 330.11 (1977). Neither 
procedure may be feasible if the FDA is adamant about the position taken in the final 
monograph unless the manufacturer can present new information. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The OTC drug review is an industrious effort by the FDA to improve its 
marketing controls over OTC drugs. 142 The deficiencies of the traditional 
NOA licensing approach, including the enormous amount of time and 
resources necessary to process individual drug applications and the 
grandfather clauses exempting most OTC drugs from the "new drug" 
definition, required innovation by the FDA. By defining GRAS&E and 
misbranding, the FDA provides all parties with more certainty concerning 
the status of individual drugs under the Act. In addition, it also eliminates 
the inequities caused when some drugs remain on the market indefinitely 
while competitive drugs are subjected to FDA enforcement. 
The advisory panels are essential to the review because of the prestige 
that the panel members contribute to the review and because of their 
effectiveness in evaluating data and formulating comprehensive reports. 
The panel framework also allows maximum visibility and accessibility to 
panel operations through the liaison members and by allowing interested 
persons to attend and participate jn panel meetings. 
The OTC drug review provides for expeditious enforcement because 
the question whether particular drugs are GRAS&E and not misbranded 
is determined administratively. The courts, to which the FDA must ulti-
mately resort for enforcement, will likely accord the monographs legisla-
tive effect, which will limit judicial inquiry to whether a drug complies 
with the applicable monograph. The role of the courts will be to determine 
whether there is an adequate evidentiary basis to. support the FDA, 
especially when the final monograph does not incorporate panel recom-
mendations. 
-David Selmer 
142 The OTC drug review can serve as a model for other regulatory programs, and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed to use the FDA's monographs in its 
regulation of drug advertising. 41 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 14,~34 (1976). The 
FTC rather than the FDA has jurisdiction over drug advertising. See Note, The FTC' s 
Injunctive Alllhority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, 75 MICH. L. REV. 745, 
758-759 (1977). The regulations would be promulgated as trade regulation rules (TRRs) 
under § 202 of the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B) (1970). 
